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bank entry in Eastern European economies 
Abstract 
An extensive empirical literature has documented the positive growth effects of equity 
market liberalization. However, this line of research ignores the impact of financial 
integration on a category of firms crucial for economic development, i.e. the small 
entrepreneurial firms. This paper aims to fill this void. We employ a large panel 
containing almost 60,000 firm–year observations on listed and unlisted companies in 
Eastern European economies to assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending 
on firm growth and financing. Foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, 
and leverage, but the effect is dampened for small firms. We also find that firms 
started during the transition period of 1989-1993 – arguably the most connected 
businesses – benefit least from foreign bank entry. This finding suggests that foreign 
banks can help mitigate connected lending problems and improve capital allocation. 
 
Keywords: foreign bank lending, emerging markets, competition, lending relationships. 
JEL: G21, L11, L14. 
4
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 498
June 2005I.  Introduction 
Neoclassical theory predicts that financial integration can foster growth in 
emerging markets because it permits capital from rich countries to be invested in 
economies with low savings but high growth opportunities. Empirical work has 
focused so far on the impact of equity market liberalization on growth. Henry (2000a, 
b, 2003) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003) among others show that equity 
market liberalization decreases the cost of capital, causes investment booms, and 
increases aggregate growth. Recent empirical firm-level evidence corroborates and 
extends these aggregate findings. Chari and Henry (2004) for example show that stock 
prices rally following equity market liberalization. They also document that 
companies with a larger free float and more liquid stocks tend to attract more investor 
interest and experience a larger decrease in their cost of equity than the other listed 
companies. 
While listed companies seemingly benefit from financial integration through a 
lower cost of equity capital, the impact of integration on non-listed firms has not been 
investigated thoroughly yet and hence remains unclear. In developing countries stock 
markets are often not well developed and as a consequence few firms are listed (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)). Growth prospects in those 
countries depend to a large extent on the creation of new businesses and investment of 
non-listed companies. 
 This paper aims to analyze how and to what extent the process of financial 
integration can benefit this category of small entrepreneurial firms, an issue that has 
so far been largely neglected in the literature. In order to do so, we focus on a 
different aspect of financial integration, which has captured a lot of attention in the 
policy debate, but less so in the academic community: foreign bank entry. 
Unlisted companies in countries with underdeveloped equity markets and 
weak shareholder protection rely to a large extent on debt and specifically on bank 
credit to fund investment (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) 
and Giannetti (2003)). Foreign banks may thus represent an invaluable source of 
capital for small firms and foster the creation of new companies. 
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Foreign banks may not only have easier access to foreign capital than 
domestic banks, and thus present a stable source of external funds for firms, but they 
may also contribute to mitigating problems that afflict bank lending. In many 
developing countries, banks often lend to cronies (Laeven (2001) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003)). As a consequence established companies 
owned by related individuals receive funding even if inefficient, while young and 
potentially highly profitable firms face credit rationing. Foreign banks have fewer 
connections to local families and politicians. Therefore, foreign banks may be more 
inclined to fund promising projects, rather than related or state-owned firms. In 
addition, foreign banks may import lending expertise and sound practices. 
There are reasons however why small firms may not be able to benefit to the 
full extent from financial integration, even in the case of foreign bank entry. Foreign 
banks may lack local information; a major problem in countries where asymmetric 
information problems are severe and legal enforcement is weak (Acharya, Sundaram 
and John (2004)). In addition foreign banks are often large organizations and reluctant 
to decentralize decision power. However decentralization is necessary if lending 
decisions need to be based on soft information, as is often the case when dealing with 
small and young firms. As a result the local branches of foreign banks may specialize 
in funding large firms and overlook small firms. Such neglect may create concerns 
that foreign bank presence may be detrimental to the financing and growth of small 
and young businesses, if foreign banks would compete away domestic banks. To 
conclude, small and young firms may be able to benefit from financial integration but 
even if financial integration involves foreign bank entry, possibly only to a lesser 
extent than large and established companies. To the best of our knowledge, so far no 
other study has investigated this differential impact of integration. 
We explore a comprehensive dataset containing both listed and unlisted 
companies operating in the Eastern European economies. The dataset we employ is 
the most comprehensive source of information on entrepreneurial companies in 
emerging markets. The large panel, containing almost 60,000 firm–year observations, 
allows us to assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth and 
financing. We face a potentially insidious endogeneity problem, i.e. foreign banks 
may in particular enter countries that are expected to grow more. We instrument our 
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proxies for foreign bank presence with characteristics of the institutional environment 
that are known to affect foreign banks’ willingness to grant loans but are 
predetermined with respect to foreign bank entry. Additionally, we are not only 
studying the effect of foreign lending on average firm growth, but also investigate 
which type of firms grows more. This investigation significantly assuages any 
lingering doubts about the direction of causality. 
In short, we find that foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, 
and leverage, but that the effect is significantly dampened for small firms. Our 
findings suggest that although large firms benefit more from foreign bank presence, 
small entrepreneurial companies also profit from financial integration. 
Since we focus on Eastern European economies, we can use the regime shift 
that took place between 1989-1993 as a natural experiment to evaluate whether 
foreign banks mitigate problems of related lending. We conjecture that firms created 
during the transition period are more likely to belong to cronies who established 
businesses in a moment of confusion to strip assets from the government. We find that 
when foreign bank presence becomes more pervasive these firms receive fewer loans 
and grow less. In contrast, foreign banks facilitate access to credit and foster growth 
of young companies born after the transition period. Perhaps more surprisingly, 
companies already existing before the transition period also receive more loans. This 
is most likely due to the fact that only the most viable businesses survived. Overall, 
these findings suggest that foreign bank entry helps mitigating problems of related 
lending. 
Not only has foreign bank presence an impact on individual firm performance, 
but it also affects industrial structure. Foreign bank lending fosters entry and exit 
especially in bank dependent industries. This suggests that foreign banks are more 
willing to take hard choices than domestic banks, and confirms that foreign bank 
presence helps to mitigate connected lending problems. Even though foreign banks 
favor entry, lack of local knowledge remains a handicap. Indeed we find that small 
firms have a lower market share and a lower proportion of total assets in countries 
with stronger foreign bank presence. 
A few studies have already analyzed the lending practices of foreign banks. 
Mian (2004) for example shows that foreign banks in Pakistan avoid lending to 
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opaque firms, especially if the cultural and geographical distance between the CEO 
and the loan officer is large. Analogously, Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) 
document that foreign banks in Argentina have difficulties lending to informationally 
opaque firms. Clarke, Cull and Soledad Martinez Peria (2001) and Clarke, Cull, 
Soledad Martinez Peria and Sanchez (2002), on the other hand, find that foreign banks 
lend to small firms at least as much as domestic banks do. Using survey data they 
further document that both small and large firms assess access to credit to ease 
following foreign bank entry. However, none of these papers has analyzed the actual 
impact of foreign bank integration on firm growth, capital structure, and investment 
policies. To the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to do so. 
Our paper is related to a vast literature on finance and growth which following 
the lead of King and Levine (1993a, b) has analyzed how financial development in 
general and banking system development in particular affect growth in a large cross-
section of countries.
1 We evaluate different aspects of financial development, namely 
financial development induced by the integration of banking systems. Additionally, in 
contrast to most of the literature, we use firm level data (not macro data). In this 
respect, our paper is mostly related to recent studies that employ firm level data and 
analyze how different aspects of financial development affect firm growth and 
investment. In particular, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) analyze the effect of 
financial development on firm growth, entry, and capital structure across Italian 
provinces. Similarly, Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2004) analyze the effect of 
banking system deregulation on French firms and industrial structure. We 
complement their work by looking at the firm and industry level effects of a different 
aspect of a banking system, i.e., foreign bank presence. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II reviews the predictions 
regarding lending in emerging markets and foreign bank orientation, and presents 
recent empirical findings. Section III introduces the data and sample characteristics. 
Sections IV discusses the variables used in the specifications and displays and 
discusses the empirical results on firm growth and financing. Section V analyzes 
sectoral performance. Section VI concludes. 
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II. Theoretical Predictions on the Effects of Foreign Bank Entry in 
Eastern European Economies 
In this Section we aim to highlight the possible benefits and drawbacks of 
foreign bank entry, in particular for Eastern European economies. In this way we 
strive to identify the channels through which foreign bank entry may affect firm 
growth and industrial structure, the main issue that we explore in the rest of the paper. 
A.  Credit Availability 
Financial integration allows capital to flow from capital-abundant countries, 
where expected returns are low, to capital-scarce countries, where expected returns 
are high (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)). Capital inflows may foster growth by 
increasing the amount of funding available to domestic projects. 
More in general, in countries with underdeveloped financial systems like the 
Eastern European economies, financial integration should increase the supply of 
finance and thus expand the national financial system of these countries. In this 
respect, financial integration is expected to spur faster growth across the board (Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), Guiso, et al. (2004)). 
The beneficiaries of financial market integration may well depend on the 
nature of the capital flows. Wider availability of funds decreases the interest rate and 
the ensuing decrease in the cost of capital should abet all firms. Equity market 
liberalization on the other hand clearly benefit mainly listed companies or unlisted 
companies that are large enough to consider an IPO. 
Since all firms borrow from banks, the benefits of foreign bank entry may well 
be more evenly distributed. Foreign bank presence fostering the development of the 
banking system widens the availability of credit and relaxes firm capital constraints 
also for small and young firms. Foreign bank presence may thus have pervasive 
positive effects on a country’s level of entrepreneurial activity. 
We expect that foreign bank entry might have been particularly beneficial for 
Eastern European economies. After the fall of the communist regimes, Eastern Europe 
badly needed capital to restructure its real economy. In particular, state-owned 
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enterprises had to modernize to compete in competitive markets. Additionally, 
Eastern European economies badly needed new small firms to provide basic consumer 
goods and services, and entrepreneurs initially lacked access to start-up capital. But 
the Eastern European banking sector initially seemed inadequately small to satisfy this 
hefty demand for funds. For example, in 1993 domestic credit over GDP equaled 
around 55 percent in the transition countries in our sample and average bank assets 
per capita were below 1,300 US Dollars (Source: IMF International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook). In contrast, in the other 46 developing countries domestic credit 
over GDP actually exceeded 85 percent and average bank assets were above 1,500 US 
Dollars per capita. Bank assets in many developed European countries surpassed 
40,000 US Dollars per capita. Foreign capital channeled by foreign banks contributed 
significantly to relax these constraints. By 1997 for example average bank assets in 
the transition countries had already increased to almost 2,000 US Dollars per capita. 
B.  Sounder Lending Practices 
The ownership structure of domestic banks often leads to lending practices 
that are far from sound. Local governments and shareholders of non-financial 
companies often control domestic banks in developing countries. State or corporate 
control may give rise to conflicts of interests with pernicious effects on financial 
stability. 
La Porta, et al. (2003) for example find that Mexican banks make larger loans 
at a lower interest rate to related companies that are then more likely to default. 
Similarly, state-owned banks are often driven by political considerations. Sapienza 
(2004) convincingly shows that in Italy loans from state-owned banks are a vehicle 
for supplying political patronage. Consistently, Mian (2003) finds that state-owned 
banks in emerging economies perform uniformly poorly and only survive due to 
strong government support. 
Government ownership of banks is pervasive around the world, but 
particularly acute in Eastern European economies. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2002) for example estimate that governments control on average 40 percent 
of total bank assets, but in Eastern Europe governments still controlled almost 70 
percent of all bank assets in the year 2000. 
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Problems of related lending seem also omnipresent in Eastern Europe. Laeven 
(2001) for example finds that banks in Russia often grant larger loans to companies 
that own equity in the bank. In addition, politicians in Eastern Europe continue to 
mobilize state-owned banks to support employment in state-owned or even recently 
privatized enterprises.
2 
Opening the domestic financial sector to foreign competition helps to mitigate 
these conflicts of interests. Domestic firms typically do not control foreign banks. 
While foreign governments own some foreign banks and these banks may be driven 
by political motives when lending to their respective home constituencies, these 
foreign state-owned banks are also naturally unencumbered by any domestic 
ownership ties and political motivations in making lending decisions. 
For all these reasons, we expect foreign bank lending to stimulate firm growth 
and leveraging, not only because foreign banks may direct more capital into the 
country, but also because foreign bank presence may enhance allocational efficiency. 
Foreign banks are likely to shun businesses created during the transition years, 
because often these firms were mere conduits to strip assets from the government. 
There is actually evidence that domestic, in particular state-owned, banks favored 
transition businesses and in the process of privatization made large loans to potential 
entrepreneurs to enable them to tender and acquire firms (Simonson (2001)). 
Small and young firms, a category particularly affected by the ineptitude and 
corruption of domestic bank officers (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004b)), are 
expected to benefit most from foreign bank lending. Firms untainted by any past bank 
or state ownership ties are likely to be able to access to more bank loans and thus 
grow more if foreign bank presence increases. In addition, foreign bank lending 
should increase new firm creation and entry. 
C.  Hard versus Soft Information 
Foreign banks may seek promising local projects and lend at fair rates rather 
than lending to related firms at below market loan rates. Foreign banks may also 
import lending expertise and sound lending practices. But foreign banks may suffer 
considerable organizational handicaps in engaging small and young local firms, a 
category of firms important for growth in developing countries. 
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Banks are often already sizeable before venturing abroad, following customers 
or seeking diversification (see the review by Clarke, Cull, Soledad Martinez Peria and 
Sanchez (2003)). Once abroad, they may cater to international companies from their 
home country, which seek their services (Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003)) and 
are often considered safer and more profitable borrowers. However, large banks may 
suffer from managerial diseconomies when engaging both relationship (small) and 
transactional (large) clients (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)). 
Even more importantly, foreign banks may fail to collect “soft” information 
(for example, a character assessment of an entrepreneur, the degree of trust), which is 
crucial in lending to small firms. In fact, small and young firms typically report little 
or no “hard” information, for example detailed financial statements, credit history etc. 
(Berger and Udell (2002), Petersen (2002)). The use of soft information in lending 
decisions requires however a decentralized organization that grants local branch 
managers substantial decision powers (Liberti (2002)), because soft information 
cannot be passed as easily as hard information within the bank (Stein (2002)). Foreign 
banks may hesitate to decentralize because the local bank personnel may be 
considered lacking expertise or even untrustworthy.
3 
Some of these concerns may be mitigated by the fact that improvements in 
communication and information processing technology may have altered the 
possibilities to tap into, collect, and relay information on small businesses. Hence the 
range of firm opaqueness over which foreign banks are willing to fund may have 
expanded (Petersen and Rajan (2002)). Nevertheless, foreign bank presence may still 
hamper small and young firm financing and growth, in particular if foreign banks 
substitute for domestic banks, as we discuss in the next Section. 
D.  Competition, Stability, and Dynamic Effects in the Banking System 
Even though access to credit for small and young firms may tighten when 
foreign bank presence is large, the net impact on these firms still need not be negative. 
Foreign bank presence may influence the banking system of a country in a number of 
different ways, such that small firms still end up benefiting. This is true even if no 
foreign banks would directly lend to small firms. 
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In developing countries, including Eastern European economies, foreign banks 
are often more efficient and profitable than domestic banks (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2000), Green (2003), Naaborg, Scholtens, de Haan, Bol and de Haas 
(2003)). Fostering competition, foreign banks may reduce profits and interest margins 
of all banks operating in the market (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) 
and Unite and Sullivan (2003)). 
In developing countries, foreign bank entry may also stabilize the financial 
system (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2002)). First, foreign banks have sounder 
lending practices and accumulate fewer bad loans. In addition foreign banks may be 
more resilient to negative shocks because of their direct access to foreign savings. On 
the other hand, foreign banks may introduce more volatility in lending because they 
can more easily find alternative investment opportunities (Morgan and Strahan 
(2003)) or transfer shocks from their home countries (Soledad Martinez Peria, Powell 
and Vladkova Hollar (2003)). However, the latter effect is likely to be second order in 
emerging markets that are generally exposed to significantly larger shocks than the 
foreign banks’ home countries. Consistently, de Haas and Lelyveld (2003) find no 
evidence of increased instability following foreign bank entry for a set of transition 
countries. To the extent that foreign bank entry actually reduces concentration, fewer, 
not more, banking crises should ensue (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004a)). 
Finally, the mode of foreign bank entry may determine its effects on local 
financing. It is well known that if foreign banks enter through mergers and 
acquisitions, they have the potential to harm small local firms borrowing from the 
domestic target bank. Berger and Udell (1996) and Peek and Rosengren (1996) for 
example find that as domestic banks grow through consolidation, they tend to reduce 
the supply of loans to small businesses, in particular when the acquirer previously 
focused on large-firm lending (Peek and Rosengren (1998)). 
On the other hand if foreign banks enter a new market by opening new 
branches they do not substitute domestic banks but simply increase the number of 
active financial intermediaries. Enhancing the development of the domestic banking 
system (as in II.A) without decreasing the number of financial intermediaries with 
local information can only be positive. This is also true if foreign banks enter by 
acquiring local distressed banks or state-owned banks, as has often been the case in 
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Eastern Europe. Distressed or state-owned banks were often plagued by ill-conceived 
and corrupted lending policies, and were unlikely to have played a major role in 
fostering local entrepreneurial activity in the first place. 
Given the actual mode of entry of foreign banks in Eastern European 
economies it is not clear whether small firms were harmed considerably. In the first 
part of the nineties, foreign banks established primarily greenfield subsidiaries in 
Eastern Europe (de Haas and Lelyveld (2003)), increasing the level of financial 
intermediation without substituting domestic banks. When foreign banks acquired 
existing domestic banks they more often than not acquired banks in need of fresh 
capital, sometimes encouraged to do so by domestic regulation (to obtain a license in 
Poland for example, Naaborg, et al. (2003)). Foreign banks started only recently 
merging subsidiaries with domestic banks they already control, spurred by and 
contributing to an industry-wide global consolidation trend. 
Whatever the mode of entry, even though the entrant or newly acquired 
foreign bank may focus on servicing predominantly large firms, incumbent or de novo 
domestic banks may step up the plate to fill the funding gap. Berger, Goldberg and 
White (2001) and Berger, Bonime, Goldberg and White (2004) show this to be the 
case in the US following domestic bank mergers that increased bank size and shifted 
the merged bank towards large business lending. Bonin and Abel (2000) provide 
anecdotal evidence that this dynamic effect may have moderated the impact of foreign 
bank entry in Hungary. 
To conclude foreign bank entry may foster competition, efficiency, and 
stability, in which case firm growth and financing should increase across the board. 
On the other hand, small firm growth and financing may be negatively affected if 
foreign banks enter through M&As. In that case the net effect will also depend on the 
dynamic response by other competing banks. 
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III.  Methodology and Identification 
Identifying the effects of foreign bank entry is not an easy task and poses 
problems similar to the identification of the effects of financial development on 
growth. The mere correlation between financial development and growth cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of causality because financial markets may develop in the 
anticipation of future opportunities. Analogously, foreign banks may enter and lend to 
a larger extent in countries that are expected to grow more in the future. 
We try to tackle this problem in different ways. First, we analyze the effect of 
foreign bank lending on firm rather than country growth. Looking at firm growth 
allows us to partially mitigate the problem of reverse causation because we are able to 
control for country fixed effects, time-varying growth opportunities, financial 
development, and GDP per capita. 
Second, we can analyze the differential impact of foreign bank lending on 
firms with different characteristics (small and large firms, firms created before after 
and during the transition period). In this way, we test the validity of the channels 
through which foreign bank entry is expected to affect firm growth. Even if average 
firm growth and foreign bank lending were correlated because of an omitted common 
factor, it would be difficult to argue that such an omitted common factor affects the 
relation between foreign bank lending and firm growth in a systematic way for firms 
with different characteristics. 
Third, and perhaps most convincingly, our results become stronger if we 
instrument foreign bank lending. During the sample period Eastern European 
countries pursued reforms that improved to varying degrees the protection of investor 
rights. We employ the creditor rights detailed in Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) as 
instruments. In particular, our instruments include: (1) creditors’ control of the 
bankruptcy process, (2) creditors’ control of the bankruptcy process, including 
reorganization consent, (3) the legal provisions on security interests, and (4) the ex 
post creditors’ sanctions on management. Previous studies suggest that protection of 
creditor rights affects foreign bank lending. Esty (2003), for example, finds that 
different legal and financial systems affect the composition of loan syndicates. In 
15
ECB





particular, foreign banks provide a greater share of total funds in countries with strong 
creditor rights, strong legal enforcement, and less-developed financial systems. 
We use predetermined values of the institutional variables as is consistent with 
a causal link, and exploit changes in investor protection across countries to identify 
the effect of changes in foreign bank lending on our variable of interest.
4 The intuition 
behind our identification strategy is similar to Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). They use 
the deregulation of bank branches in the U.S. as an instrument to show that 
improvements in the quality of bank lending are positively related to economic 
performance. Similarly, we analyze how the removal of implicit barriers to foreign 
bank presence –a weak institutional environment—affects economic performance. 
To be able to interpret the relation between foreign bank presence and 
economic performance as a causal relation, we surmise that foreign banks did not 
influence the initial configuration of creditor rights or any later amendments.
5 This is 
likely because foreign banks are not part of the domestic constituency the politicians 
want to please to be reelected. However, to establish the causal link, we also need that 
domestic banks and other economic agents did not influence creditor rights in a way 
that is systematically correlated to expected economic performance. In general, 
institutional change is never completely exogenous. The process of legal change in 
Eastern European economies however corroborates our assumptions. These countries 
started from very different initial conditions and exhibit a tendency to legal 
convergence Pistor (2000). Legal convergence seems to have been primarily the result 
of international institutions’ technical assistance programs and of the harmonization 
requirements for countries wishing to join the European Union. 
In addition, stronger creditor rights may both help and hurt domestic banks (as 
creditors and competitors to foreign banks respectively) and incumbents firms. The 
state of flux in the political process in Eastern Europe and the multitude of parties 
affected by changes in creditor rights complicated lobbying in a way that it makes 
arduous to posit and find a systematic link between economic performance and legal 
change, and particularly not given its timing and speed (which is the variation that we 
exploit to identify the effects of foreign bank lending). For these reasons, we believe 
that it is reasonable take legal change as exogenous. 
16
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We are aware that institutional characteristics may have a direct effect on 
growth for instance because they affect financial development. Desai, Gompers and 
Lerner (2003) for example show that country-specific political, legal, and regulatory 
variables influence entrepreneurial activity in Eastern European economies. However, 
Desai, et al. (2003) do not include creditor rights in their study and we further 
conjecture creditor rights may affect firm financing decisions foremost through its 
impact on foreign bank presence. Most importantly, we control for aggregate growth, 
GDP per capita, and in particular financial development, which are the alternative 
channels through which the institutional framework can affect firm growth. 
Finally, we do not look at a single aspect of firm growth. We evaluate the 
impact of foreign lending on firm growth and look at the mechanisms through which 
foreign lending may affect growth. When observing a positive relationship between 
foreign lending and growth for a given category of firms, we can only interpret the 
correlation as causation if a mechanism consistent with such an interpretation – i.e., 
this category of firm increases the use of bank credit and decrease the use of 
alternative source of funds such as trade credit – is supported by the empirical 
evidence. Additionally, we also evaluate to what extent the results we find using firm 
level data are present in the aggregate sectoral data. All considered we are confident 
that our empirical methodology can provide evidence suggestive of a causal impact of 
foreign bank lending on the growth of entrepreneurial firms across different countries. 
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IV.  Data and Sample Characteristics 
A.  Data Sources 
We use data from a variety of sources. To construct our firm and sector 
specific variables we use the 2003 edition of Amadeus compiled by Bureau Van 
Dijck. Giannetti (2003) and recently Desai, et al. (2003) and Klapper, Laeven and 
Rajan (2004) also employ this dataset. 
 We extract firm-specific data for 14 Eastern European transition countries, 
listed in Table 1, for the years 1993 to 2002. The sample includes companies that 
meet at least one of the following three criteria: (1) its operating revenues are larger 
than or equal to ten million euros, (2) its book assets are larger than or equal to 20 
million euros, and (3) the number of employees is larger than or equal to 150. The 
criteria are somewhat more restrictive for larger countries, in our sample the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine: cutoffs then equal 15 million, 30 million, and 200 
respectively. Coverage of firm financial information expanded steadily throughout the 
sample period, but in particular from 1997 to 1998. For example, in 1993 we have 
information on the main balance sheet items for 1,673 firms, while in 2002 23,541 
firms were covered. 
To construct our bank sector variables we use the 2003 edition of Bankscope. 
We obtain GDP growth from the World Development Indicators, and, as explained in 
Section III, rely on Pistor, et al. (2000) for the creditor rights indices. 
B.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports sample characteristics by country. We report for each country 
the number of firms, foreign bank lending as a percentage of total bank lending, and 
average firm assets, age, and growth in assets in the year 2000 (a typical year for 
which coverage is optimal). 
Our main proxy for foreign bank presence is the percentage of foreign lending 
(% Foreign Lending). We define % Foreign Lending as the ratio of loans extended by 
foreign banks to total bank loans in a given country.  A bank is defined to be foreign if 
foreign individuals, corporations, financial institutions, or even foreign governments 
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combined own more than 50 percent of the bank. This cutoff is similar to the one used 
in previous literature (see, for instance, Mian (2003)) and reflects common majority 
voting rules. As the distribution of foreign ownership is highly bimodal, changing the 
cutoff will hardly affect the results. Indeed, 63 percent of all banks in the sample are 
100 percent domestically owned. But foreigners own less than 50 percent in only 11 
percent of the banks, while in almost 20 percent of the cases foreigners own more 
than 90 percent. 
Foreign ownership is also more concentrated than domestic ownership. For 
example, the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI) (the sum of squared shares) of 
ownership concentration for domestic banks is only around 0.25, for foreign banks it 
is almost 0.75 (the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level). Hence, 
foreign banks are controlled by one or two foreign blockholders. 
There is a large variation in foreign bank lending across the 14 countries and 
across time. The percentage foreign bank lending in 1996 for example ranges from 0 
in the Republic of Macedonia to almost 92 percent in Bulgaria and across all countries 
foreign lending increases almost 10 percent in only four years, from 44 percent in 
1996 to 53 percent in 2000. 
In Table 1 we also categorize the countries by 1996 foreign lending into a high 
and low group (cutoff: 50 percent). Foreign lending in the low group increases faster. 
In addition, firm asset size and age are lower and asset growth is higher in the low 
group. The latter finding is particularly surprising in light of our earlier discussion but 
taken together with the empirical evidence on size and age demonstrates the value of 
investigating the differential impact of firm growth within each country. 
We measure firm performance by sales and asset growth. As often argued, 
firm growth should be partly determined by the availability of credit. Some 
observations on firm sales seemed excessively large. To limit the influence of these 
outliers, we censored the growth rates at the 1 and 99 percentiles, admittedly ad hoc 
cutoffs. Given the many observations and controls in our empirical models, our key 
results should not be affected. Table 2 reports firm sales averaged across the sample in 
US Dollars. 
We define sales growth as ln(Salest+1/ Salest) (and present it in percentage 
terms in all specifications). We denote this variable in the Tables as Δln(Sales). The 
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logarithm form should again contribute to minimizing the effects of the censored large 
values. Mean sales growth thus defined equals 11.3 percent. Similarly defined, mean 
asset growth equals 4.0 percent. 
We further assess the effect of the availability of credit on the changes in the 
firms’ capital structure by focusing on the increase in financial debt between t-1 and t 
relative to the firm’s total assets at time t (ΔDebt/Assets), and the increase in account 
payables between t-1 and t relative to the firm’s total sales at time t ( ΔTrade 
Credit/Sales).
6 Wider availability of credit should increase leverage, but decrease the 
use of trade credit. Consistently with this interpretation, the mean change in leverage 
equals 1.5 percent. The mean change in trade credit is –10.5 percent. 
As indicated earlier foreign bank presence in a particular year in a country is 
measured as the percentage ratio of foreign bank to total bank lending. This variable is 
one of our main variables of interest. Foreign lending may enhance the availability 
and allocation of credit, increasing debt capacity (and therefore leverage) and 
stimulating growth. The mean percentage foreign lending equals 37.9 percent. 
To analyze the differential effect of foreign bank presence on different 
categories of firms, we focus on three important firm characteristics: size, age, and 
efficiency. Firm size is a common measure of firm access to external funds and 
visibility. Smaller firms are typically expected to grow faster. However, to the extent 
that foreign banks have difficulties handling soft information or focus on large firm, 
small firm growth and ability to increase their debt may be stunted. We measure firm 
size by the logarithm of the number of employees. The mean (median) number of 
employees equals 645 (296). 
Firm age, measured in years, commonly stands for the public track record of 
the firm, and is introduced in logarithmic form to capture the decreasing informational 
content of such a record as the firm ages. Younger firms are generally smaller, though 
the coefficient of partial correlation between the proxies for age and size in our 
sample is actually smaller than one percent. Like small firms, young firms are 
expected to grow faster. To the extent that foreign banks have difficulties handling 
private soft information, young firm growth and access to debt may be lower than for 
other firms. In addition, firm age in transition countries may proxy for the 
trustworthiness of the public track record. During the transition period that occurred in 
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those countries roughly between 1989 and 1993 many firms may have been started as 
a vehicle for asset stripping by dubious management. We call the firms that were 
created between 1989 and 1993 (the transition period) the “transition firms”. Firms 
that started before 1989, on the other hand, though possibly trust worthier than the 
transition firms may have seen their public track record set to null and as a result may 
have been considered not unlike firms that started after 1993. To account for this non-
monotonicity in age we also introduce dummies that equal one if the firm originated 
before or after the transition period respectively. The mean (median) age equals 18 
(11) with 19 percent of the firms established before 1989 and 45 percent after 1993. 
Finally, we introduce a measure of firm efficiency. Ex ante it is not entirely 
clear how efficiency will affect firm growth and financing. However, given their 
better lending practices and technology, foreign banks should have fewer problems 
finding and funding efficient firms. Moreover, foreign banks being less connected 
should favor efficient firms instead of related borrowers. Hence, foreign bank 
presence is expected to foster access to credit and growth for the most efficient firms. 
To construct a measure of firm efficiency we divide firm sales by the number of 
employees. We call a firm efficient when its sales per employee exceed that of the 
mean firm in its industry (first digit NACE), country, and year. According to this 
definition, 29 percent of the firms are classified as efficient. 
In addition to the independent variables discussed above, we include a set of 
control variables. In all specifications we include up to 13 Country dummies to 
control for the fact that elements of a country’s institutional and legal framework may 
affect firm growth and financing, as documented by Desai, et al. (2003) and Giannetti 
(2003). We also include up to 10 Industry and 9 Year dummies to control for industry 
and business cycle effects. 
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A.  Firm Growth 
1.  Benchmark Specifications 
To assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth, we 
start by regressing firm sales growth on foreign lending, firm characteristics, and 
country, industry, and year dummies. Next we instrument foreign lending using 
country specific measures of creditor rights and introduce the key interaction terms 
between foreign lending and firm characteristics. 
We report the results in Table 3. We take a few natural steps to arrive at our 
empirical benchmark specification that is Model IV. In Model I we employ ordinary 
least squares, in Model II we instrument % Foreign Lending with the four creditor 
protection variables and add the efficiency and interaction dummies. In Model III we 
introduce the transition period dummies and in Model IV we add the ratio of total 
bank lending to GDP as a measure of financial development. We further correct all 
standard errors for clustering at the firm level. Taken together, the models illustrate 
the robustness of the estimated coefficients and the need to instrument our measure of 
foreign lending. 
Our first-stage estimates confirm that the four legal protection variables have 
high explanatory power for foreign lending, as we can reject the null hypothesis that 
the four coefficients of legal protection variables equal zero at a 1 percent level of 
significance in a regression of foreign lending on the instruments and all other 
exogenous variables. In this respect, our instruments do not suffer from the problems 
of weak instruments described by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). 
The coefficients in all models suggest that foreign lending stimulates firm 
growth. The interaction terms we introduce in the various specifications in Table 4 
suggest that small firms and more surprisingly more efficient and older firms benefit 
less from foreign bank entry. The fact that small firms benefit to a lesser extent from 
foreign banks suggests that inability to use soft information may indeed represent a 
handicap for foreign banks. It is at first sight more surprising that foreign banks do not 
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seem to convey loans to more efficient companies. The latter result however is not 
robust, economically quite small, and due with all probability to the definition of our 
proxy for efficiency. This variable, defined as sales per employee, most likely 
captures whether a firm business is close to the optimal size in terms of sales. This 
interpretation is consistent with the fact that efficient companies as well as older and 
large firms have lower growth rates. 
The finding that older firms benefit less than younger companies is only 
apparently in contrast to the evidence that firms with lower degree of information 
asymmetry such as large firms receive fewer loans from foreign banks. This finding 
must be interpreted in the light of the experience of the Eastern European economies. 
Older firms in our sample are more likely to be born during the transition period and 
are to a large extent run by entrepreneurs who were able to enjoy the favors of 
politicians. The fact that they do not fully benefit from foreign bank entry simply 
suggests that foreign banks might be able to mitigate problems of related lending. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that these companies appear to have worse 
corporate governance in our sample. Although it is difficult to define corporate 
governance in a sample that predominantly includes small unlisted companies, like 
ours, we have information on whether companies have attracted outside shareholders, 
an indication that they probably have a viable business and promise outside investors 
a reasonable return (Giannetti and Simonov (2004)). We find that companies born 
before and after the transition period have more dispersed ownership. In slightly more 
than 20 percent of them, the controlling shareholder controls less than 25 percent of 
the capital. In striking contrast, 44 percent of the companies born during the transition 
period have a shareholder controlling more than 25 percent of the capital. Most 
importantly, 45 percent of the companies born during the transition period have the 
state or a bank as a shareholder. Only 24 (21) percent of the companies born after 
(before) the transition period have the state or a bank as a shareholder. This indicates 
that problems of related lending may indeed be more pervasive for companies born 
during the transition period and that foreign banks help to cure these problems. 
We further explore the conjecture that foreign banks discriminate against 
transition firms by including two dummies for firms born before and after the 
transition period (instead of firm age). We find that a higher percentage of foreign 
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lending affects only the growth of firms born during the transition period –i.e. those 
firms with worse corporate governance – negatively and that firms born after 1993 but 
also the firms that were already in business before 1989 benefit from foreign bank 
presence. The pre-1989 firms that are still active are likely to be viable businesses. To 
this extent, these results suggest that foreign banks may enhance capital allocation. 
2.  Economic Relevancy 
All, but one, reported coefficients in Model III are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. This significance is not surprising given the large number of 
observations (57,433) we employ. Hence assessing the economic relevance of the 
estimated coefficients is crucial. Table 4 reports such an assessment of the economic 
relevance of the various independent variables for sales growth. For easy reference we 
take the inverse logarithm of the calculated impacts. 
Table 4 shows the impact on sales growth of an increase in foreign lending 
from 20 percent to 50 percent (approximately one half of a standard deviation on each 
side of the mean). This experiment would entail for example moving from Serbia and 
Montenegro to Hungary in 2002 or following the path of Romania from 1998 to 2002, 
of course all ceteris paribus.  This 30 percent jump in foreign lending increases firm 
sales growth by almost 16 percent, a substantial effect (in the specification without 
interaction terms).
7 
 The interaction terms suggest that however the effects of foreign bank lending 
are unevenly distributed across firms with different characteristics. As already 
indicated, foreign lending nurtures growth especially for large, non-transition, or 
inefficient firms. Firms larger than 300 employees (approximately the median) grow 
by more than 17 percent while firms smaller than this cutoff grow at a rate of only 15 
percent. 
Hence the picture that arises is that foreign bank lending in transition countries 
fosters firm growth, but that large firms benefit more. This effect is both statistically 
significant and economically relevant. We find these results in line with common 
fears (“small firms are hurt when foreign banks enter”) but contrasting with the work 
by Clarke, et al. (2001) mentioned earlier. Their results indicate that the total effects 
were moderate, but they did not find significant differences between the impact on 
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small and large firm growth, possibly because of data and methodological issues. For 
instance, they were not able to fully control for differences in country growth 
opportunities as we do, and most importantly they evaluated the effects of foreign 
bank presence only through the entrepreneurs’ declared ease in access to credit. 
Foreign lending further fosters growth of the non-transition firms. If foreign 
bank lending increases for example from zero to 35 percent (the mean in our sample), 
pre-1989 and post-1993 firms grow by approximately 2 and 4 percent faster than the 
other firms, ceteris paribus. This finding suggests that related lending has a first-order 
effect on capital allocation and that foreign bank entry contributes significantly to 
mitigating this problem. 
Finally, we also find that efficient firms grow slower and are adversely 
affected by foreign bank lending. However, in contrast to our other findings, this 
result is not robust, and may well depend on the fact that, as we note above, our 
measure of efficiency also captures optimality in scale. 
3.  Robustness 
A possible critique to our interpretation of the results is that foreign bank 
presence and our instruments are correlated to some other factors we have not yet 
controlled for. For example the country and year fixed effects we include may not 
capture country time-varying growth opportunities. Foreign banks expanding their 
lending to be able to profit from the host country growth could explain the positive 
correlation between foreign bank presence and growth. Hence we control for the 
yearly country growth rate to capture a-synchronicities in business cycles. Although 
this variable is often positive and significant, our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
More problematic for our interpretation is that growth opportunities correlated 
with our proxy for foreign bank presence may differently affect the various categories 
of firms. We could for example observe that foreign banks expand their presence 
when growth opportunities improve while at the same time large firms grow faster, 
for reasons independent of their external financing arrangement. We already control 
for a wide-range of firm characteristics including industrial sector, firm size and age. 
However, it is plausible that some firms are able to expand sales and investment more 
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during a boom because of access to internal funds. For this reason we introduce a 
variable we call Firm Internal Growth that equals ROA / (1 – ROA) in all 
specifications. As usual, ROA is the firm’s Return on Assets. Results again are 
virtually unaffected. 
Next we explore if the identity of the lending banks matters. First, foreign 
banks could foster growth not because they are foreign, but simply because they are 
not state owned. To explore this possibility we include, the percentage of lending 
granted by private domestic banks or foreign banks. While this variable has generally 
a positive effect on growth, the effect of foreign bank lending remains positive and 
significant and, perhaps most importantly, larger from an economic point of view. 
Second, we explore whether foreign bank lending is correlated with financial 
development. Hence the positive effect of foreign bank lending on growth could 
merely reflect the fact that more credit is available, rather than how it is available. For 
this reason we include a measure of financial development, defined as total bank 
lending to GDP, in Model IV. Results are qualitatively almost unaffected. In 
unreported specifications we also interact our proxy for financial development with 
the firm characteristics that we employ to explore how the gains from foreign bank 
presence are distributed. Interestingly enough, financial development affects small 
and large firms equally, as the coefficient on the interaction term between firm size 
and financial development is generally not significant. However, this coefficient is 
mostly negative suggesting that, if anything, financial development ceteris paribus 
favors small firms, a result also found by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine 
(2004). 
We also find that financial development positively affects firm growth, as 
expected, but only if we do not control for the proportion of foreign lending. In 
interpreting this surprising finding we must keep in mind that our specification 
already includes country fixed effects. Hence we identify only the impact of changes 
in total loans to GDP on firm growth. Our results then indicate that an increase in total 
loans, in particular an increase of domestic loans to GDP, does not necessarily have a 
positive impact on firm growth. Our findings are consistent with empirical evidence 
showing that lending booms often result in an accumulation of bad loans (Gourinchas, 
Valdes and Landerretche (2001)) and that domestic banks frequently engage in 
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connected lending. To further explore this issue, we insert both the ratios of domestic 
loans to GDP and foreign loans to GDP in various specifications. The unreported 
estimates indicate that only increases in domestic loans to GDP are negatively related 
to firm growth in a consistent way. 
Finally, we replace sales by asset growth and rerun all regressions. We report 
Model V in the last column of Table 3 and the corresponding economic relevancy 
tests in the third column in Table 4. All results are unaltered, except that now the 
coefficient on the interaction between foreign lending and the efficiency dummy 
becomes insignificant. The magnitudes of the impact on asset growth of changing the 
independent variables are surprisingly similar to the magnitude of the impact on sales 
growth. 
B.  Firm Financing 
To investigate the mechanism underlying the results reported so far, we study 
the impact of foreign bank lending on firm financing. In particular, our interpretation 
of the empirical evidence on firm growth would be corroborated if we observed that 
firms – and in particular the firms that are observed to grow faster when foreign bank 
presence increases – make a larger use of financial loans if foreign banks expand 
lending. We first analyze growth in firm financial debt relative to total assets, defined 
as ((Debtt - Debtt-1 )/ Assetst). Table 5 reports only one of the three steps we take to 
reach our benchmark specification, as the other two steps are not all that informative. 
We notice however that going from I to II that foreign lending no longer plays a direct 
role in affecting leverage growth and that all of the effect in Model II channels 
through the interaction terms. 
As expected on the basis of our previous results, we find that foreign bank 
presence increases access to credit especially for large firms and non-transition firms. 
The economic effects remain sizeable. If foreign bank lending increases from 20 to 50 
percent, small (large) firms increase their financial debt to asset growth by 0.6 (1) 
percent. Similarly, firms created before (after) the transition period increase financial 
debt to asset growth by 0.4 (0.8) percent. 
Next, we run a similar set of robustness exercises as in the firm growth 
section, i.e. we consecutively add country growth, firm internal growth, and country 
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financial development. We report only the latter specification in Model III. Results 
are virtually unaffected, except that foreign lending again directly fosters leverage 
growth when financial development is added to the specification. Interesting, a higher 
level of credit to GDP does not imply higher leverage. Unreported estimates suggest 
that while an increase in foreign loans to GDP is related to higher leverage for all 
firms, this is not true for domestic loans to GDP, possibly suggesting that domestic 
banks train relatively more of their increase in lending towards the domestic public 
sector. 
Firms appear not only to obtain access to more bank credit, but also the 
maturity of their liabilities increases (Model IV), especially for large and non-
transition firms. Hence the widely held concern that foreign bank lending involves 
short-term “hot” money that is readably retracted during crises seems misplaced, at 
least for less risky and less opaque firms (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller 
(2004), Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004)). This finding is however also an indication 
that foreign bank presence may swing bank lending towards long-term transactional 
loans, as banks with strong relationships with borrowers generally offer short-maturity 
loans to be able to exercise control (Berger and Udell (1995)). 
The increase in financial debt is also accompanied by a decrease in the cost of 
debt, defined as interest paid to total financial liabilities (Model V). Foreign banks 
appear to lower the interest rate in particular to firms without connections. Large 
firms, which were probably favored by state banks, experience a smaller decrease in 
the cost of debt.
8 
As financially constrained firms may make more use of trade credit (Petersen 
and Rajan (1994)), we expect that firms that benefit most from foreign bank entry in 
terms of growth and access to credit will also make less use of trade credit. To explore 
this conjecture, we analyze the changes in trade credit relative to sales ((Trade Creditt 
- Trade Creditt-1)/ Salest) as a function of the same independent variables we 
employed so far in Model VI in Table 5. Indeed, we find that companies that are able 
to make greater use of bank loans when foreign bank presence increases also use less 
trade credit. This suggests that increased foreign bank presence contributes to relax 
financial constraints especially for the categories of firms we have identified. 
However the average effect of foreign lending on the variable measuring changes in 
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trade credit use is not significant in the specification (not reported) in which we do not 
include the interaction terms. This result should not come a surprise as all firms in our 
sample – even the ones that benefit most from foreign bank loans – are likely to be 
financially constrained (and consequently make large use of trade credit). From an 
economic point of view, the decrease in trade credit relative to sales due to an increase 
in foreign lending is however sizeable (Table 6 Model VI). A 20-to-50 increase in 
foreign lending reduces trade credit growth by 2 percent for transition firms, and by 
around 4 percent for non-transition firms. 
To conclude, foreign lending increases access to foreign loans, relaxes credit 
constraints, and fosters firm growth. Foreign lending also improves allocational 
efficiency as the cost of debt decreases for firms without connection with banks (the 
non-transition firms) to a larger extent. 
C.  Sector Performance 
In this Subsection, we assess the industry effects of foreign bank lending. This 
assessment is relevant for different reasons. First, this exercise allows us to evaluate 
the aggregate implications of foreign bank presence. In particular, we will be able to 
answer the question whether an increase in foreign lending affects firm entry, exit, 
and industrial structure. Answering this question allows us to further explore the 
channels through which foreign bank presence affects the economy. If increased 
foreign bank presence for example helps to mitigate problems of related lending, we 
expect that the exit rate is higher in countries with stronger foreign bank presence. 
Similarly, if foreign banks shun small firms, we expect that a country’s industrial 
structure will be affected and that larger companies will command more market share 
and assets. 
The sectoral analysis allows us to further scrutinize the validity of our 
identification strategy. We introduce a new instrument. From Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2001), who compile an international database on commercial banking 
regulation, we glean the fraction of foreign banks’ applications for commercial 
banking licenses that were rejected minus the fraction of domestic banks’ rejected 
applications. This variable varies across countries but not across time. Hence it is too 
weak to function as an instrument in the firm level regressions, where we include both 
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time-series and cross-sectional variation (but control for country and year fixed 
effects). However, we can exploit this variable as an instrument in the industry level 
analysis, where, as is customary in the literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998)), we 
average across sector by country (but do not use the time-series variation). This new 
instrument, capturing the real and present barriers to entry for foreign banks, is even 
less likely to enter directly in the equations we estimate than the creditor protection 
variables. Employing a Hausman test we can thus use the new variable to test the 
validity of the creditor protection variables as instruments. In all cases we explored, 
we are not able to reject the null that the investor protection variables do not have an 
independent effect in the equation. 
We investigate the impact of foreign lending on five sector characteristics: the 
number of firms, entrants, exits and the percentage of small firm sales and assets 
(defined as the share of sales and assets, respectively, of firms with employment 
below the median). We regress the logarithm of each one of these sector 
characteristics on the instrumented measure of foreign bank lending, and a measure of 
financial development. As in the previous subsection the latter measure is defined as 
the ratio of total bank lending to GDP in a country. We also include 74 industry 
dummies and control for the size of the sector in a given country with the level of 
employment at the beginning of the period. All values of the explanatory variables are 
taken at the beginning of the period while the dependent variable is a time average. 
Table 7 provides the coefficients, while Table 8 assesses their economic relevancy. 
The latter exercises are readily interpretable because the impacts are reported in level 
and at the means. The results further highlight the effects of foreign lending. Take 
entry and exit rates. Foreign bank lending seems to foster industry dynamics, as it 
stimulates both industry entry and exit. The effect is both statistically and 
economically significant as there are 15 (18) more entrants (exits) if the percentage of 
foreign lending increases from 20 to 50 percent. This is a large effect considering that 
the average number of entrant (exits) in a sector is 4.3 (2.6) and the standard deviation 
12.3 (7.8). There is instead no statistically significant effect of foreign bank presence 
on the total number of firms. These results suggest that although foreign banks may 
avoid lending to small firms, which as a consequence invest and grow less, the 
problems possibly related to the foreign bank inefficiency in using local knowledge, 
30
ECB





are not so severe as to discourage entry. Foreign lenders appear both more willing to 
engage entrants and to push exits. 
The fact that financial development is not significantly correlated with exit (or 
in some unreported specifications even negatively correlated) – after controlling for 
the fraction of foreign loans – is not surprising in the light of the evidence showing 
that domestic banks are afflicted by related lending problems. This empirical evidence 
squares with our previous firm level results showing that foreign bank presence may 
help to cure these problems. It is more surprising instead that financial development is 
not significantly correlated with firm entry after controlling for foreign loans. Foreign 
banks thus appear to spur entrepreneurial activity, at least in countries where domestic 
banks lack lending expertise and do not have sound lending policies. 
Finally, there is a dramatic difference in the way foreign lending and financial 
development may affect small firms’ investment and market share in an industry. An 
increase in foreign lending from 20 to 50 percent of total loans decreases the 
proportion of sales (assets) of firms with employment below the median 
approximately by 37 (18) percent. Again the effect is sizeable as it explains more than 
one standard deviation of the variable. Hence, foreign lending substantially reduces 
the percentage of small firms’ assets in an industry, while financial development has 
neither a statistically nor an economic significant effect, another vivid illustration of 
the important compositional effects of foreign bank lending. 
Although the previous specifications allow us to quantitatively evaluate the 
economic impact of foreign lending, they are subject to the critique that the 
institutional variables we use to instrument foreign lending have a direct impact on 
growth. To further check whether the causal interpretation that we give of our 
estimates is warranted, we follow the methodology suggested by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). Arguably, the effects of foreign bank presence should be larger in industries 
that depend more on bank loans. Similarly to Rajan and Zingales, we measure bank 
dependence in an industry with the ratio of financial loans to total liabilities. We can 
thus test whether the impact of foreign bank lending is larger in sectors that are more 
bank dependent by including an interaction variable between the proxy for bank 
dependence and foreign lending. Since our new variable of interest varies across 
sectors within a country, we are able to include country fixed effects that capture 
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unobserved country heterogeneity. The estimates show that our previous conclusions 
on the effects of foreign lending are confirmed: only in the equation for the small 
firms’ proportion of sales our variable of interest is no longer statistically significant. 
From an economic point of view, our results are even more striking. Once we control 
for country fixed effects, it emerges that while foreign banks favor entry and exit in 
bank dependent sectors, financial development is negatively correlated with both. 
The economic effect of foreign bank presence on entry and exit is halved when 
we include country fixed effects. This suggests that there is a country-specific 
component in industry turnover. Most importantly, foreign bank presence seems to be 
related to sectoral composition. Indeed, the number of firms in bank dependent sectors 
is significantly larger in countries with stronger foreign bank presence. 
Overall, our sector analysis shows that foreign lending, industry churning, and 
large firm presence go hand in hand. Foreign lending improves credit allocation, but 
possibly to the detriment of small businesses’ investment. Additionally, the quality of 
lending policies seems to matter significantly more for economic performance than 
the lending volumes. This finding is consistent with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), 
who show that financial liberalization had positive effects in the U.S. not because an 









VI.  Conclusion 
This paper analyzes how and to what extent the process of financial 
integration can benefit small entrepreneurial firms. In particular we focus on foreign 
bank lending. Banks represent an important source of capital for small firms. 
However small firms may not be able to benefit to the full extent from financial 
integration through foreign bank entry. Foreign banks may lack the local information 
that is particularly important for lending in countries where asymmetric information 
problems are severe and legal enforcement is weak. Additionally, foreign banks are 
often large organizations themselves and may be reluctant or unable to effectively use 
soft information. Soft information is often the only information available on small and 
young firms or potential entrepreneurs. Consequently, small firms may be able to 
benefit from financial integration to a lesser extent than larger and more established 
companies even if financial integration involves foreign bank entry. 
Using a large data set of listed and unlisted companies in Eastern European 
economies, we find that foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, and 
leverage, but that the effect is dampened for small firms. Even though foreign banks 
favor entry, lack of local knowledge remains a handicap. Indeed we find that small 
firms have a lower market share and a lower proportion of total assets in countries 
with stronger foreign bank presence. 
Additionally, since we focus on Eastern European economies, we use the 
regime shift that took place between 1989-1993 as a natural experiment. We find that 
firms started during the transition period of 1989-1993, the ones which are more 
likely to have enjoyed politicians and connected banks’ favors, benefit least from 
foreign bank entry. Foreign banks also increase exit especially in bank dependent 
industries. This confirms that foreign banks are more willing to take hard choices than 
domestic banks and thus mitigate connected lending problems. 
While the impact and mechanism we identify in this paper seem robust and 
economically important, the effects we document probably provide a lower bound to 
the impact of foreign bank presence on industrial structure. In fact, the Eastern 
European economies became market economies only in the early nineties. Their 
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banking systems were largely underdeveloped and local banks lacked expertise in 
allocating loans. To this extent, the destruction of soft information due to acquisitions 
of domestic banks by foreign banks is likely to have been minimal. Arguably, the 
differential impact of foreign bank presence on large and small firms may be larger in 
countries where the acquired banks had a longer experience in extending credit to 
local firms. 
Several other interesting questions remain unanswered. For example, do the 
mode of entry, the organizational form, the ownership structure, and the country of 
origin of the foreign banks operating in the country matter for the magnitude of the 
impact on the small firm sector? And does technological development and deeper 
economic and financial integration ultimately abate the effect of foreign bank 
presence on small firm growth and leverage? Finally, do foreign banks benefit firms 
only directly through their lending? Or do they also have positive effects on domestic 
banks’ efficiency and foreign lending, which may indirectly benefit bank-dependent 
companies? We leave these questions for future research. 
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1 Levine (2004) provides a comprehensive review of the literature. 
2 See Simonson (2001) for evidence on the Czech Republic. 
3 Berger and DeYoung (2001) study the effect of physical distance on bank branch control. 
Lending to small firms across large distances and borders is less common (Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005)) and possibly less profitable for the bank (Degryse and 
Ongena (2005)). 
4 This is a direct consequence of the inclusion of country fixed effects. 
5 Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue that U.S. state level deregulation of restrictions on bank 
branching and interstate banking, the instrument used by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), was 
influenced by small-bank financial health and hence success in lobbying. See also Strahan 
(2004). 
6 Our definitions minimize the impact of changes in assets on leverage and of changes in sales 
on trade credit availability. 
7 Mean sales growth is 11 percent. In Berger, Hasan and Klapper (2004) an increase in 
Foreign Share, defined as the market share held by foreign-owned banks, from 20 to 50 
percent raises GDP growth by between 1 and 2.5 percent. Mean GDP growth between 1994 
and 2000 for the 28 developing countries in their sample equals 3 percent. 
8 Interestingly, if we consider the ratio of financial expenses (instead of only the interest paid) 
and total financial liabilities, we observe that these increase when foreign bank lending 
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